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BERNATORIAL ELECTION WITH BALANCE-McGlynn

In its fall term of 1981 the New Jersey Supreme Court decided
McGlynn v. New Jersey Public Broadcasting Authority' which, in
effect, offered the New Jersey court system as an alternative forum to
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for gubernatorial
candidates desirous of a hearing on their right of access to New Jersey
public television. Reversing its own decision rendered on the eve of the
June 1981 gubernatorial primary,2 the court held that the state public
television network is not required to give all candidates equal time on
news shows. 3 In so doing the supreme court opened the state courts to
disgruntled candidates by adopting a standard of review totally at
variance with that required by the federal government in like situations. 4 This Note will explore the current status of candidate access to
New Jersey public television and the repercussions of McGlynn on
future elections.
The controversy arose out of the May 25, 1981 decision to exclude
gubernatorial candidate McGlynn from a series of news broadcasts to
be aired on the New Jersey Nightly News by the New Jersey public
television stations. 5 The following day McGlynn, in conjunction with
the Committee to Elect Richard McGlynn Governor, filed a complaint against the Public Broadcasting Authority in the superior court,
chancery division, alleging "that the exclusion violated his rights under the Federal Communications Act, the New Jersey Campaign
Expenditures and Reporting Act, the Public Broadcasting Authority
Act, and the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution." '6 Candidate John Rafferty, who like McGlynn was
excluded from the programming, intervened after the chancery divi88 N.J. 112, 439 A.2d 54 (1981).
2 McGlynn v. New Jersey Pub. Broadcasting Auth., 87 N.J. 369, 434 A.2d 1056, rev'd on

rehearing, 88 N.J. 112, 439 A.2d 54 (1981). The case was heard on an emergent basis.
3 88 N.J. at 146-47, 439 A.2d at 71.
4 See id. at 170, 439 A.2d at 83 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring), where the Chief Justice noted
that the FCC found the news program which was the subject of this litigation to be "exempt
from regulation." Id. Chief Justice Wilentz regarded such judicial review as a venture "into an
area that is beyond the expertise of the most expert, an area where the greatest damage can be
done if those dealing with the subject matter are not extemely sensitive to the problems involved." Id. at 174, 439 A.2d at 86 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring).
5 Id. at 120, 439 A.2d at 58.
0 Id. WNET Channel 13 Television, while not part of the New Jersey Public Television
system was joined as a defendant because it too carried the New Jersey Nightly News.
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sion held that the complaint was "an appeal from an administrative
determination by the Authority" and transferred it to the appellate
division. 7 Oral argument was heard on an expedited basis on May 27,
1981.8 On that same day the appellate division rendered its decision in
favor of McGlynn and Rafferty, "directing that the. . . candidates be
included in any future forum and that statements by the excluded
candidates on the issues discussed in the telecasts already aired be
broadcast at approximately the same hour as the original segments
were shown." 9
The New Jersey Public Broadcasting Authority (Authority) immediately filed a notice of appeal and a motion to vacate the order of
the appellate division. The supreme court heard oral argument on
May 27, 1981, rendering its decision later that evening summarily
affirming the judgment below.' 0 After the primary election the supreme court granted the Authority's petition for rehearing to clarify
its prior holding."
This second opinion reversed the court's prior decision and outlined the constraints to be placed upon the Authority by the relevant
state statutory provisions, particularly focusing on three provisions in
the Public Broadcasting Authority' 2 and the New Jersey Campaign
Contributions and Expenditures and Reporting Acts. 13 In addition,
the court examined such issues as the nature of the Public Broadcasting Act,' 4 the position of public broadcasting as a public forum,' 5 the
concurrent jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission, 6 federal pre-emption of Authority regulation,' 7 and first amendment limitations on state public broadcasting entities.' 8 The court
noted the "Authority's unique position as both an instrumentality of
the New Jersey government and a crucial source of television exposure

Id.
See 88 N.J. at 118, 439 A.2d at 57.
Id. at 120, 439 A.2d at 58. The appellate court, in a two page per curiam opinion, found
that the provisions of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-39 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983) required both
the Authority and WNET 13 to broadcast the videotaped interviews of all candidates. See
McGlynn v. New Jersey Pub. Broadcasting Auth., 181 N.J. Super. 577, 439 A.2d 90 (App. Div.),
rev'd, 88 N.J. 112, 439 A.2d 54 (1981).
10 See 88 N.J .at 118, 439 A.2d at 57.
Id.
12 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 48:23-1 to -10 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983).
13 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:44A-1 to -44 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983).
88 N.J. at 126-28, 439 A.2d at 61-62.
'1 Id. at 132-33, 439 A.2d at 64-65.
16Id. at 134-37, 439 A.2d at 65-66.
17 Id. at 137-42, 439 A.2d at 66-69.
"8 Id. at 142-44, 439 A.2d at 69-70.
7

14
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for gubernatorial candidates." 9 This dual responsibility convinced a
majority of the court20 that the Authority has a duty, over the course
of a campaign, "to promote full discussions of public issues" by the
candidates and to report the campaign with "balance, fairness and
21
equity."
Substantial coverage of the 1981 gubernatorial race appeared on
the New Jersey Nightly News, a joint presentation of the Authority
and WNET Channel 13 Television.2 2 Earlier that year the Executive
Producer of the Nightly News decided to focus the program on the
campaign primaries. After airing programs which covered such campaign issues as the public financing system, the Nightly News initiated
its intensive coverage of the primary on April 15, 1981 .23 One phase of
the coverage included telecasts of brief profiles of all the announced
candidates during a regularly scheduled program entitled "A Closer
Look." 2 4 Toward the conclusion of the campaign the Executive Pro,9Id. at 126, 439 A.2d at 61. The Authority as established under the Act "is governed by the
Public Broadcasting Commission, which consists of five ex-officio members (the Commissioners
of Education and Community Affairs, the Chancellor of Higher Education, the State Treasurer
and the Attorney General) and ten other persons appointed by the Governor with the advice and
consent of the Senate." 88 N.J. at 123, 439 A.2d at 59; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:23-4(b) (West Cum.
Supp. 1982-1983). Their terms of office are for five years and members receive no compensation
for their services. Id. § 48:23-4(c), (d). Members are, however, reimbursed for their expenses in
performing their duties. The Commission appoints a paid Executive Director who oversees the
general operation of the Authority. Id. § 48:23-5. Under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:23-7(d) (West
Cum. Supp. 1982-1983), the Authority is empowered to "establish, own and operate" noncommercial television and radio stations. Id.
20 Although all justices agreed on the holding, Chief Justice Wilentz and Justice Pollock filed
separate concurring opinions which differed radically from the reasoning of Justice Pashman's
majority opinion. Justice Clifford did not participate in the decision.
2' 88 N.J. at 146, 439 A.2d at 71.
12 Affidavit of Herbert I. Bloom, Executive Producer of Nightly News, McGlynn v. New
Jersey Pub. Broadcasting Auth., 87 N.J. 369, 434 A.2d 1056, rev'd on rehearing, 88 N.J. 112, 439
A.2d 54 (1981).
23 Id.
24 Id. Additional coverage of the campaign by the Nightly News included "on-the-scene
coverage of spot news events such as endorsements of candidacy, appearances [of candidates) at
various locations throughout the State and coverage of other .. .news events where candidates
might be present." Affidavit of Gordon MacInnes, Jr., Executive Director of New Jersey Public
Broadcasting Authority, at 3, McGlynn v. New Jersey Pub. Broadcasting Auth., 87 N.J. 369, 434
A.2d 1056, rev'd on rehearing, 88 N.J. 112, 439 A.2d 54 (1981). Both McGlynn and Rafferty
appeared throughout the campaign on the Nightly News' regular campaign coverage. Id. at 4. In
addition to that coverage provided as part of the regular coverage of newsworthy events during
the Nightly News, the Authority provided other types of campaign broadcasts. These included
one-half hour news interview segments on a regularly scheduled program entitled "McLaughlin's
Beat." Seventeen of the candidates, including McGlynn and Rafferty, appeared on this show
which is conducted as a news interview by the host, John McLaughlin. Id. at 2-3. Finally, on
May 31, 1981, the Authority covered two forums sponsored by and under the control of the
League of Women Voters in which all twenty-one candidates were invited to participate. 88 N.J.
at 119, 439 A.2d at 57.
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ducer concentrated on what in his judgment were five significant
issues in the campaign.2 5 The candidates were asked to respond to
questions encompassing these areas of concern, their responses being
taped for future telecasts during "A Closer Look." ' 2 As the election
approached it became apparent that insufficient time remained to
telecast the taped responses of all twenty-one candidates before the
June 2 primary.2 7 The Executive Producer and his senior staff therefore determined, on the basis of "professional news judgment, ' 28 to
focus on the leading candidates in each party. The procedure for
broadcasting the responses remained flexible, however, to acommodate any possible change in candidate leadership. 2 The questions
posed, the manner in which they were presented, and the production
of the individual segments were solely under the control of the Nightly
News staff. 30 It was from these broadcasts that McGlynn, Rafferty, 3'
and Ann Klein 32 were excluded.
McGlynn represents one of the few instances where a stateowned broadcasting network's editorial decision has been challenged
in a state court. 33 The customary procedure, for cases involving both
public and commercial television networks, is through the mechanism
provided by the FCC. 34 This conventional administrative avenue was
25 Affidavit of Herbert I. Bloom, supra note 22, at 2.
21 88 N.J. at 119, 439 A.2d at 57.
27 Affidavit of Herbert I. Bloom, supra note 22, at 2.
28 Id.
29 Id.

30 Id.
3t 88 N.J. at 120, 439 A.2d at 58.
32 Id. at 118 n.2, 439 A.2d at 57 n.2.
33See, e.g., State v. University of Maine, 266 A.2d 863 (Me. 1970), finding a state statutory
provision prohibiting political broadcasting from a state operated station to be violative of
federal law; Donato v. New Jersey Pub. Broadcasting Auth., No. A-698-77 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. Nov. 2, 1977) (unreported decision), in which the candidate's challenge to his exclusion
from a network's sponsored debate during the gubernatorial campaign was dismissed because
"[the] entire subject has been preempted by the Federal Government by the adoption of the
Federal Communications Act .... ..Id. at 2. Interestingly, Judge Allcorn of the appellate
division heard both this case and McGlynn.
31 The Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976), and the Federal Communications Commission's interpretation of that Act provide a comprehensive body of federal
regulation regarding telecommunications. Congress created the FCC to regulate interstate and
foreign wire and radio communications in order to establish an efficient communications system.
Id. § 151. The Commission is empowered to "make such rules and regulations, ... as may be
necessary" to effectuate this purpose. Id. § 154(i). To this end, the FCC has promulgated
regulations concerning political broadcasting and the complaint procedures to be followed. See
New Primer on Political Broadcasting & Cablecasting, 69 F.C.C.2d 2209 (1978); Use of Broadcasting Facilitites by Candidates for Public Office, 24 F.C.C.2d 832 (1970).
One of the statutes McGlynn claimed violation of was 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1976). Generally,
any course of action purportedly arising under the Federal Communications Act is considered
not by the courts of any state, but by the Federal Communications Commission. Thus, in Ahmad
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pursued by a candidate for the democratic nomination, Ann Klein, on
the day after McGlynn instituted his challenge in the New Jersey
courts. 35 Ms. Klein requested an expedited ruling from the FCC regarding her exclusion from the Nightly News segments which were
limited to participation by the leading democratic contenders. 3 On
May 29, 1981, the FCC rejected Klein's complaint that her exclusion
violated the equal opportunities provision of 47 U.S.C. § 315, 3 and
v. Levi, 414 F. Supp. 597 (E.D. Pa. 1976), the court dismissed a complaint alleging a violation of
the fairness doctrine under section 315 holding:
[T]he Commission is the exclusive primary forum in which alleged violations of the
Act may be vindicated. The instant complaint contains no hint that plaintiffs have
applied to the Commission for relief. Accordingly, it must be dismissed against
defendant broadcasters for failure to exhaust the federal administrative remedies
provided by Congress as a part of a comprehensive scheme to regulate the broadcasting industry in the public interest.
Id. at 603 (citations omitted).
11 Letter from Ann Klein to FCC, at 1 (May 27, 1981) (requesting FCC ruling).
30 Id.
17 Letter from FCC to Ann Klein, at 2 n.1 (May 29, 1981) (dismissing Klein's complaint).
The equal opportunities provision is found in 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976). Section 315, in full,
provides that:
(a) If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for
any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting
station: Provided, That such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the
material broadcast under the provisions of this section. No obligation is imposed
under this subsection upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such
candidate. Appearance by a legally qualified candidate on any(1) bona fide newscast,
(2) bona fide news interview,
(3) bona fide news documentary (if the appearance of the candidate is
incidental to the presentation of the subject or subjects covered by the
news documentary), or
(4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events (including but not limited
to political conventions and activities incidental thereto),
shall not be deemed to be use of a broadcasting station within the meaning of
this subsection. Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as relieving
broadcasters, in connection with the presentation of newscasts, news interviews,
news documentaries, and on-the-spot coverage of news events, from the obligation imposed upon them under this chapter to operate in the public interest and
to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues
of public importance.
(b) The charges made for the use of any broadcasting station for any of the purposes
set forth in this section shall not exceed the charges made for comparable use of
such station for other purposes.
(c) The Commission shall prescribe appropriate rules and regulations to carry out
the provisions of this section.
Id. § 315.
Another § 315(a) challenge to candidate exclusion from public television was in Kaplan v.
Wisconsin Educ. Com. Bd., No. 78-C-557 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 17, 1981)(unreported decision),
where the plaintiff was a candidate for that state's governor. When refused participation on a
televised debate between Republican and Democratic rivals, she sought to enjoin the debate and
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found that the "fairness doctrine" 38 had not been violated since it only
requires that broadcasters present contrasting views on issues of public
importance and that requirement may be satisfied by the appearance
of opposing candidates
who are, in the judgment of the broadcaster,
"significant. ' 39 It was concluded that further inquiry into the complaint was unnecessary since the stations involved acted reasonably
"in determining that the appearances by [Klein's] opponents in interviews broadcast during evening newscasts are exempt from the equal
opportunities provision. "40
In 1968, the New Jersey Legislature created the New Jersey
Public Broadcasting Authority in response to the inadequate coverage
by existing television networks of New Jersey political events. 41 Prior
to this legislative action there existed a near total dependence upon
out-of-state television stations for reporting New Jersey news. 42 An
to obtain declaratory relief under a claimed violation of the first and fourteenth amendments.
The district court dismissed the motion, maintaining that under § 315(a) the plaintiff was
rightfully excluded. Id. at 4. It was also held that primary jurisdiction over complaints regarding
the coverage or application of the Communications Act lay with the FCC, with appeal from its
decision to the circuit courts of appeal and not to the district courts. Id. at 3.
38 The "fairness doctrine" was first formulated by the FCC in its Report on Editorializing by
Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). The doctrine was codified in an amendment to
section 315(a) of the Communications Act of 1934. Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-274, 73
Stat. 557. The fairness doctrine, and consequently section 315(a), requires that the broadcaster
devote a reasonable amount of air time to the discussion of controversial issues of public
importance and that the coverage be balanced. See supra note 37 for the text of section 315(a).
Thus, if a broadcaster presents one viewpoint, he must offer a reasonable opportunity to others
to express their opinions. See Lutzker, Campaigns on the Air: Political Broadcast Litigation, 6
Litigation 36, 38-39 (1980); Note, The Future of Content Regulation in Broadcasting, 69 CAL.
L. REV. 555, 561-65 (1981).
"oLetter from FCC to Ann Klein, at 4 (May 29, 1981).
40 Id. The news exemptions are found in 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1)-(4) (1976). See supra note 37
for the text of the exemptions. For a discussion of the latitude given broadcasters by the FCC in
determining what constitutes news programming, see Kennedy for President Comm. v. FCC,
636 F.2d 417, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
41 The Authority was established by the New Jersey Public Broadcasting Authority Act of
1968, ch. 405, 1968 N.J. Laws 1379 (1969)(current version at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 48:23-1 to -10
(West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983)), as an independent authority to "[e]stablish, own and operate
noncommercial educational television . ..stations" and public broadcasting systems to serve the
State of New Jersey. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:23-7(d)(West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983). "New Jersey
Public Television is a four channel, noncommercial network, broadcasting on the UHF band:
Channel 23, WNJS Camden; Channel 50, WNJM Montclair; Channel 52, WNJT Trenton; and
Channel 58, WNJB New Brunswick. Corporate headquarters and main studios are in Trenton,
with a studio facility in Newark, and a South Jersey news bureau at Stockton State College in
Pomona. Signals from the four transmitters reach most New Jersey residents and are received in
parts of New York, Pennsylvania, Connecticut and Delaware." NEW JEaSEY PUBLc TELEVSION,
1980 ANNUAL REPORT 2.
11 A 1976 FCC report stated that New Jersey had approximately 7.4 million residents and
was the eighth most populated state in the nation. State of New Jersey Television Service, 58
F.C.C.2d 790, 791 (1976)[hereinafter cited as Television Service]. A majority of its population
was located within the metropolitan areas of New York City and Philadelphia. Id. It had been
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FCC study conducted in 1976 affirmed the need for the Authority. 43
The investigation determined that the deficient coverage by the seven
stations in New York City and the four in Philadelphia on the VHF
band, combined with the several UHF stations located in New Jersey
whose weak signals reached but a small segment of the population,
indicated that "there is a need for improved New Jersey television
service . . . by some or all of those mass-audience stations licensed to
44
either New York City or Philadelphia."
Under the Authority Act, a majority of the supreme court found
two statutes which lent credence to a standard for content regulation
of broadcast news coverage of political campaigns. 45 These were section 9,46 which prohibits the Authority from "supporting or opposing
any political party or candidate for public office,"' 47 and subsection
7(h), 48 which empowers the Authority to "[a]ssume responsibility for

determined, however, by the New Jersey Coalition for Fair Broadcasting in a 1973 study, that
New York City and Philadelphia devoted only 5% and 13%, respectively, of local news time to
coverage of New Jersey news, whereas approximately 30% of each market consisted of New
Jersey households. Id. at 790.
3 d. A significant example of inadequate coverage by out-of-state television stations can be
seen in this illustration highlighted in GOVEaNOR'S COMMISSION ON PUBLIC BROADCASTING, REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO NEW JERSEY CITIZENS (May 1968):
A whole new geographical area, the richest undeveloped real estate in the
world-the New Jersey meadowlands- is under discussion as this report is being
prepared. No New York or Philadelphia television station has covered in New Jersey
any of the hearings-hearings which have produced serious statewide discussions for
the first time. Public broadcasting for New Jersey should be reporting the proceedings of these hearings. Public broadcasting for New Jersey will analyze in depth these
issues.
Id. at 68.
" Television Service, supra note 42, at 804. The New Jersey Supreme Court in McGlynn
noted that FCC policy may have been the cause of the deficient local service. 88 N.J. at 122, 439
A.2d at 58-59. To support this proposition, the court quoted from a 1961 FCC primer issued to
New York and Pennsylvania stations detailing the extent of their obligations to cover New Jersey
elections:
[A] New York City broadcaster might broadcast news and public affairs programming concerning major events in outlying cities or areas receiving its signal, but
could hardly be expected to give in-depth coverage of local elections from Connecticut or Central New Jersey. A Connecticut or New Jersey station might cover such
elections, but we would not fault a New York station that chose, in its discretion, to
ignore them.
88 N.J. at 122, 439 A.2d at 59 (quoting Television Service, supra note 42, at 798).
45 88 N.J. at 124, 439 A.2d at 60.
46 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:23-9 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983) reads: "The authority shall be
prohibited from supporting or opposing any political party or candidate for public office,
elective or otherwise, and from attempting to influence the enactment of legislation. The
authority shall not, however, be precluded from promoting full discussion of public issues." Id.
47 Id.
41 Id.

§ 48:23-7(h).
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the character, diversity, quality, and excellence of programming
which is released via its licensed facilities, provided that programs or
series of programs of a controversial nature shall be presented with
balance, fairness and equity." 4 The court regarded these statutes as
boundary lines drawn by the legislature to establish distinct parameters for Authority activities.5
According to the court, the aforementioned statutes were to be
read in conjunction with the Campaign Contributions and Expenditures Reporting Act (Campaign Contributions Act) which the legislature first enacted in 1973.51 Justice Pashman was of the opinion that
"[t]he provisions of each, separately, raise[d] a strong implication that
.. .the Authority's campaign coverage must be executed with 'balance, fairness and equity.' "52 The court found the Campaign Contributions Act particularly significant since "[o]ne of the crucial problems facing any candidate, especially one of limited means, is access to
television."'5 3 The overall policy of the Act was to provide public
supported financing for " 'general election campaigns for the office of
Governor . . . free from improper influence.' "s4 The problem of
candidate access is exacerbated in New Jersey by the lack of major
network coverage of local elections and the high cost of buying adver55
tising time.
The first area the court analyzed was the relative lack of local
political coverage options. In its original form the Campaign Contributions Act covered only the general election50 and required the Authority to devote a "specified amount of time for each candidate on
49

Id.

w 88 N.J. at 124, 439 A.2d at 59. "[A]lthough these provisions vest the Authority with broad
discretion in news coverage, they also define the contours for exercise of this discretion, thus
belying any argument that the Legislature intended to free the Authority completely from all
statutory direction." Id.
51 Ch. 83, 1973 N.J. Laws 155 (current version at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:44A-1 to 44 (West
Cum. Supp. 1982-1983)).
12 88 N.J. at 131, 439 A.2d at
64.
Id. at 125, 439 A.2d at 60.
I'
Id. at 124-25, 439 A.2d at 60 (quoting Act of May 6, 1974, ch. 26, § 14, 1974 N.J. Laws 55,
59, current version at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-27 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983)). The
legislature stated that:
It is hereby declared to be a compelling public interest and to be the policy of
this State that general election campaigns for the office of Governor shall be financed
with public support pursuant to the provisions of the act. It is the intention of this act
that such financing be adequate in amount so that candidates for election to the
office of Governor may conduct their campaigns free from improper influence and
so that persons of limited financial means may seek election to the State's highest
office.

Id.
55 88 N.J. at 125, 439 A.2d at 60.
56 Id.
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the ballot."' 57 The legislature amended the statute in 1980 "extending
public financing to the primaries, [and] adding a guarantee of fixed
amounts of air time for each primary candidate."58 The court noted,
however, that in response to the extraordinary number of gubernatorial candidates, the legislature in early 1981 again amended the statute eliminating "the specific minimum time provisions and replac[ing]
them with a general obligation to promote full discussions by the
candidates in accordance with Federal law." 59
The McGlynn court framed the issue to be whether the three
statutory provisions contained in the Authority Act and the Campaign
Contributions Act were intended to place constraints upon the Authority's treatment of the New Jersey gubernatorial elections.6 0 The
court observed that such a "determination must be made in light of
the Authority's unique position as both an instrumentality of the New
Jersey government and a crucial source of television exposure for
gubernatorial candidates.""' Interpreting the Authority Act's provision requiring "balance, fairness and equity" in programming 2 and

57 Id.

Id. Subsequent to the 1980 amendment the statute provided:
a. The New Jersey Public Broadcasting Authority . . shall promote full discussions of public issues by the candidates for nomination for election to the office of
Governor on the ballot in any primary election, free of charge to the candidate. The
authority shall make available at least 2 hours of time on its stations for joint
appearances by the candidates, and at least 15 minutes of time on its stations for
individual appearances by each of the candidates. The authority may promulgate
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to effectuate the purpose of this
subsection.
b. The authority shall promote full discussions of public issues by the candidates
for the office of Governor on the ballot in any general election, free of charge to any
such candidate. The authority shall make available at least 1 hour of time on its
stations for joint appearances by such candidates, and at least 1 additional hour of
time on its stations for individual appearances by each of such candidates. The
authority may promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to effectuate the purposes of this subsection.
Act of July 23, 1980, ch.74, § 13, 1980 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 240, 249, amended by Act of April 2,
1981, ch. 107, § 1, 1981 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 265.
59 88 N.J. at 126, 439 A.2d at 61.,The statute now provides:
The New Jersey Public Broadcasting Authority . . . shall promote full discussions of public issues by the candidates for nomination for election or election to the
office of Governor on the ballot in any primary or general election, in accordance
with Federal law and free of charge to the candidate. The authority may promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to effectuate the purpose of this
section.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-39 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983).
60 88 N.J. at 126, 439 A.2d at 61.
61 Id.
12 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:23-7(h) (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983). See supra text accompanying
note 49 for the text of this provision.
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the provision prohibiting political advocacy by the Authority,6 3 the
court reasoned that the Authority must refrain from endorsing candi64
dates or advancing its own views on the public issues of the day.
Furthermore, concluded the majority, the legislature envisioned full
65
and balanced discussion of public issues.
The court specifically found that "[t]he Legislature's need to
mandate balance was obvious."" 6 It noted that the legislature must
have sought to avoid public perception that the governor would take
67
advantage of the "Authority to advance his own political ends."
Under the Act, the governor has substantial control over the appointment of some senior Authority personnel, including the Executive
Director,6 a situation which lends itself to the possibility of political
abuse. 69 To avoid this, the legislature wrote provisions into the Act
characterized by the court as "precautionary measures . ..intended
to eliminate any appearance of impropriety. ' 70 The majority acknowledged that the two provisions of the Authority Act might be
construed more narrowly. 7' For example, the prohibition against political partisanship could have been read as a mere ban against actual
endorsement or financial contribution by the Authority to an individual candidate. 72 The court, however, regarded the statutory standards
73
as encompassing "a duty to cover elections in a balanced fashion,
even more expansive than that required by the federal "fairness doc74
trine" standard.
The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the appellate division's
finding of an "imperative of equal time" 75 in the language of the
Campaign Contributions Act, under which the lower court sustained
63 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:23-9 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983). See supra note 46 for the text of
this provision.
88 N.J. at 126, 439 A.2d at 61.
65 Id.

88 N.J. at 126, 439 A.2d at 61.
Id. at 127, 439 A.2d at 61.
68 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 48:23-2, -4, -5 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983).
6988 N.J. at 126-27, 439 A.2d at 61.
70 Id. at 127, 439 A.2d at 61.

07

Id.
72 Id.
71

73

Id.

7, Id. The "balance, fairness and equity" language could be interpreted as nothing more than

a state reflection of the "fairness doctrine" of the Federal Communications Act. Id. As noted by
the court, "the 'fairness doctrine,' embodied in 47 U.S.C. § 315(a), concerns balance among
ideas, not balance among individual advocates of those ideas." Id. at 126 n.9, 439 A.2d at 61 n.9;
see also New Primer on Political Broadcasting and Cablecasting, 69 F.C.C.2d 2209, 2215 (1978).
But see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (finding FCC's rules concerning
right to respond constitutionally valid).
75 88 N.J. at 128, 439 A.2d at 62.
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McGlynn's claim for access.7" The majority opinion rejected this proposition since the 1981 amendment had eliminated any equal time
requirement previously contained in the Act. 77 While agreeing with
the Authority that the statute no longer mandated equal time for each
candidate, the court did, however, interpret the Authority Act as
78
imposing an affirmative duty to "actively cover the campaign.
Thus, the narrower issue confronting the court was the extent of
Authority discretion in its election coverage under the Campaign
Contributions Act.
Examining the legislative history of the Campaign Contributions
Act, the court determined that the legislature did not intend "to
remove all limitations on the Authority's discretion. ' 7 The court
noted that the Act imposed specific time requirements upon the Authority until the candidacies of twenty-one individuals threatened to
"hamper" the Authority. 0 According to the court, it was in response
to the large field of candidates "and the effects it would have on
Authority election coverage" that the 1981 amendment "was enacted
to remove the minimum coverage requirements, and only thereby to

71 181 N.J. Super. at 578, 439 A.2d at 91. The appellate division found that "[t]here [was] no
question but that the Legislature ha[d] established, principally for the benefit of the public, a
policy in aid of broad exposure of the persons seeking party nomination as candidate for
governor, and for broad dissemination of the views of such persons on the pertinent issues.
Running through and part of this policy also is the imperative of equal time," Id. (citation
omitted).
77 88 N.J. at 128, 439 A.2d at 62. See supra notes 58 & 59 and accompanying text.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 129, 439 A.2d at 62.
80 Id. The wisdom of specific time allotments was questioned by members of the New Jersey
Legislature as early as 1974. During a hearing on amendments to the New Jersey Campaign
Contributions and Expenditures Reporting Act, the following colloquy occurred:
Assemblywoman Burgio: I have one question on the statement on the last page-the
last paragraph of the statement where it says, "one hour of free time and one
additional hour," it says that the bill includes this. First of all, where is it in the bill
and isn't that kind of limited-one hour during the whole campaign?
Assemblyman Burstein: That is paragraph 14 of the bill which incorporates the one
hour provision. The one hour is free time for a joint appearance and the additional
hour is for individual appearances. I think that that is fairly adequate for what is
needed. This relates, of course, to the New Jersey Public Broadcasting Station; it
does not encompass television advertising that would take place on the major networks.
Assemblywoman Burgio: I didn't think one hour was very much; if a person isn't
home that night he could miss the whole thing. I think public broadcasting could
spare a little bit more time than one hour.
Assemblyman Burstein: That's possible but I think that a candidate becomes a bore
after a while, repeating the same things, and the hour is sufficient.
Public Hearing on Assembly No. 1246 Before State Gov't and Federaland Interstate Relations
Comm., 192d Leg., 1st Sess.7 (1974).
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increase the Authority's discretion regarding election coverage."' '
Through the amendment, the legislature delegated to the Authority
the respons bility " 'to provide coverage of the gubernatorial primary
and general election campaigns and give the Authority the discretion,
within the limits of Federal and State Law as to the manner in which
it does so.' "182
The majority opinion refuted the Authority's argument that the
amendment demonstrated the state's intent to repeal all constraints
imposed on its election coverage except those imposed by the Federal
Communications Act. 83 Such an interpretation, reasoned the court,
would render the provision redundant, for all broadcasting systems
84
are licensed by the FCC and subject at a minimum to its rules.
Moreover, the Campaign Contributions Act specifically provides that
the Authority "shall promote full discussions of public issues,"' 85 by
gubernatorial candidates thereby imposing a greater duty to actively
cover the campaigns than is required by the "federal exhortation to
operate in the public interest."' 86 Thus, the provision mandating promotion of discussions by candidates, when read with the relevant
Authority Act provisions, "imposed a duty to promote full discussions
by the candidates in a balanced, fair and equitable fashion. ' 87 This
stricture inherently called for a fair distribution of coverage to all the
candidates.88
The McGlynn court dismissed the argument that an expansive
reading of the statutes would convert New Jersey Public Television
into a "public forum" 89 to which all citizens would have a right of
81 88 N.J. at 129, 439 A.2d at 62.
82 Id. (quoting Sponsor's Statement accompanying S. 3059, 199th Leg., 1st Sess. (1981))

(emphasis added by court).
83 Id.
11 Id. at 130, 439 A.2d at 63. The New Jersey Supreme Court in McGlynn held that
superfluous constructions are to be avoided wherever possible. Id.; see In re Toms River Water
Co., 82 N.J. 201, 412 A.2d 430 (1980); 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CoNsTRucrIoN §
46.06 (4th ed. 1973).
85 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-39 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982).
88 88 N.J. at 130, 439 A.2d at 63.
87

Id.

88 Id.

at 131, 439 A.2d at 63. "We therefore hold that the Authority is vested with wide

discretion in determining broadcast content but that, with respect to coverage of a gubernatorial
campaign, it is required by New Jersey statute to promote full discussion of the issues by the
candidates, consistent with 'balance, fairness and equity.' " Id. at 132, 439 A.2d at 64. The
majority vehemently denied the concurring opinion's assertion that it "ha[d] imposed a comprehensive regulatory scheme on the Authority, making judges the new programmers of New Jersey
public television." Id. at 132, 439 A.2d at 64.
8 The McGlynn court defined a public forum as "a legal designation given to certain places,
'such as public streets, sidewalks, and parks' where historically everyone has been free to speak,
subject only to 'time, place or manner' restrictions." Id. at 132-33, 439 A.2d at 64-65 (quoting L.
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access. 0 Justice Pashman argued that the McGlynn holding would not
turn public television into a "public forum" because the broadcast
medium is unlike areas, for example parks, which have traditionally
been open to public access, in that the medium has not been dedicated
to public use. 9 1 Any right of access arising from New Jersey state law is
restricted to gubernatorial candidates. °2 Thus, as the court noted, the
statute "concerns only legally qualified candidates, in only one elec9 3
tion, which occurs only once every four years."

12-21, at 689 (1978)). For lengthy treatments of the
-'public forum" issue see Note, Access to State-Owned Communications Media- The Public
Forum Doctrine, 26 UCLA L. REv. 1410 (1979), and Cass, FirstAmendment Access to Government Facilities, 65 VA. L. REv. 1287 (1979). Public forums have been "strictly limited to those
areas in which tradition mandates a right of access." 88 N.J. at 132-33, 439 A.2d at 64-65; see
United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114 (1981) (mail
boxes not considered to be public forums); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (public areas of
military base not public forums); City of New York Municipal Broadcasting System, 56
F.C.C.2d 169 (1975) (radio and television air waves not public forums).
The courts have not found a constitutional right of access in analogous cases involving other
state supported media. In situations where the editorial control has been passed from the state to
private persons, the presence of state support does not convert the medium into a public forum.
Thus, in Avins v. Rutgers University, 385 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920
(1968), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied plaintiffs claim for relief that would
have forced the editors of the Rutgers Law Review to print plaintiff's article. The court held that
state support created no right to use the medium, particularly since the editorial process at the
law review was entirely private. Id. at 153-54. The court in Mississippi Gay Alliance v.
Goudelock, 536 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 982 (1977), held that where
state university officials did not control or supervise the content of a student newspaper, a
student group had no right to have its advertisement appear in the publication. Id. at 1075-76.
0 88 N.J. at 132, 439 A.2d at 64.
91 Id. at 132-33, 439 A.2d at 64. A recent case, Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n,
656 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1981), considered the issue whether a public right of access inheres in a
public television station. In Muir, plaintiffs sued to compel the Alabama Educational Television
Commission to broadcast the film "Death of a Princess," a film about the execution of a member
of the Saudi royal family. The court held that because a government "owns" or financially
supports a speech medium does not alone create a public right of access to that medium, much
less a public right to force that medium to present a particular film. It is only when government
has created a forum dedicated to a public use that the right of access may obtain. Id. at 1020; see
also Canby, The FirstAmendment and the State as Editor: Implicationsfor PublicBroadcasting,
52 TEx. L. REv. 1123, 1149-50 (1974) (advocating that public forum doctrine not be extended to
noncommercial stations even if state action is present); Chase, Public Broadcasting and the
Problem of Governmental Influence: Toward a Legislative Solution, 9 U. MicH. L. Rxv. 62,
102-03 (1975).
12 88 N.J. at 133, 439 A.2d at 64; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-39 (West Cum. Supp. 19821983).
93 88 N.J. at 133, 439 A.2d at 64. The New Jersey Supreme Court's position was substantiated by CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981). There, the United States Supreme Court held that 47
U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1976), which gives candidates for federal office a right of access to FCClicensed stations, does not create a general right of access. It stated:
Petitioners are correct that the Court never approved a general right of access to the
media. Nor do we do so today. Section 312(a)(7) creates a limited right to 'reasonTRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §
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To reach the state law issues, the New Jersey Supreme Court
found that the applicable New Jersey statutes were not pre-empted by
the federal law in the form of the Federal Communications Act. 94 The
court noted at the outset that the Authority, an FCC licensee, is
"subject to minimal content regulation"9 5 under federal law. It
then
focused upon the more rigid obligations imposed upon broadcasters
under the federal equal opportunity provision. 96 That provision,
though originally intended to provide candidates equal "use" time,
was amended to eliminate certain news related broadcasts from equal
time constraints9 7 because Congress recognized that "an all inclusive
equal-time requirement"9' 8 would inhibit campaign coverage. "Congress concluded . .. that active political debate and rigidly equal
political debate were conflicting policy goals." 99 The equal time exemptions demonstrated that, at least with respect to news broadcasts,
Congress deemed the risk of inhibitory coverage more detrimental to
the public than preferential treatment of candidates. 0 0 The court
further observed that the FCC policy was to construe the news exemptions broadly. 0 1 To illustrate the FCC policy the court quoted from
the FCC's letter to Ann Klein dismissing her complaint against the
Authority on the basis that the program from which she and McGlynn
were excluded fell within the news exemption.102 From this the
able' access that pertains only to legally qualified federal candidates and may be
invoked by them only for the purpose of advancing their candidacies once a compaign has commenced.
Id. at 389 (emphasis in original).
04 88 N.J. at 134, 439 A.2d at 68. A comparable determination was made by a district court
in Kelley v. WMUL-TV, 7 Media L. Rep. 1094 (S.D. Va. 1980). In Kelley, the plaintiff sought a
temporary restraining order to compel defendant public television station to include him in a
televised political debate between Republican and Democratic candidates for governor. In
granting the motion the district court held that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction did not bar
the court's consideration of a gubernatorial candidate's lawsuit charging the state educational
broadcasting authority with violating the first amendment by its refusal to include the plaintiff
in the debate. This was in view of a lack of administrative remedies to redress the plaintiff's
alleged injuries, and in view of the absence of any special Federal Communications Commission
expertise in handling constitutional claims against state governments. Id. at 1096.
15 88 N.J. at 134, 439 A.2d at 65. The FCC is authorized to grant broadcasting licenses only
to those broadcasters who will operate in the public interest. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1976). Congress
has delegated to the FCC the responsibility of determining whether licensees are fulfilling that
duty. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 802 (1978).
9 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1976). See supra note 37 for the full text of the provision.
97 Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-274, 73 Stat. 557.
91 88 N.J. at 135, 439 A.2d at 65.
99 Id.
100Id. at 136, 439 A.2d at 66.
101Id.; see also Kennedy for President Comm. v. FCC, 636 F.2d 417, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
102 88 N.J. at 137, 439 A.2d at 66. The letter to Ann Klein indicated that:
In order to encourage uninhibited news coverage, the Commission believes its
appropriate role in this area requires deferring to the good faith news judgments of
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McGlynn court gathered that the FCC policy is "to leave it to the
individual broadcasters to determine the degree to which the equal
0 3
opportunity rule should be enforced in news broadcasting."'
Having explained the political broadcasting obligations imposed
under federal law, the court turned its attention to the Authority's
assertion that federal law "pre-empts any state provisions which impose upon broadcasters greater equal opportunity obligations." 04 The
court found that federal pre-emption occurs in either "of two situations: . . . where 'Congress has either explicitly or implicitly declared
that the states are prohibited from regulating' in this area, or . . .
where a state statute 'actually conflicts with a valid federal statute.' "105 "The test for determining whether actual conflict exists is
'whether, under the circumstances of [a] particular case, [the state's]
law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress.' "106
Justice Pashman was of the opinion that had the Authority been a
private broadcaster, the pre-emption issue would have been more
complex because of the difference in the degree of deference given
licensees under federal law and the state law. 0 7 "The New Jersey
Public Broadcasting Authority, however, is not a private broadcaster
. ..it is an instrumentality of the State of New Jersey," 0 8 and this
fact the court found to be dispositive of the pre-emption issue. 09 The
McGlynn court analyzed the pre-emption issue by analogizing broadcast regulations to commerce regulations, showing the difference between a state serving as a regulator of private purchases " 0 and a state
broadcasters. To this end, the Commission will not substitute its judgment for that of
the broadcaster but rather will disturb such decisions only when they are found to be
unreasonable or in bad faith.This policy is applicable to broadcasters' determinations of whether particular programming falls within any of the news exemptions, as
well as journalistic judgments concerning what material should be presented in news
programming.
Letter from FCC to Ann Klein, at 3 (May 29, 1981).
103 88 N.J. at 137, 439 A.2d at 66.
104

Id.

105 Id. (quoting Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157-58 (1978)).
106Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)); see, e.g., Farmers Educ. &

Coop. Union v. WDAY, 360 U.S. 525, 535 (1959) (state libel law pre-empted where its enforcement frustrated purpose of federal broadcasting law). For comprehensive treatment of the preemption doctrine see Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and
the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623 (1975) and Note, A Framework for Preemption
Analysis, 88 YALE L. Ray. 363 (1978).
107 88 N.J. at 138, 439 A.2d at 67. The court indicated that the difference was not, however,
"primafacie inconsistent." Id.
108 Id.

109Id.
110 Id.
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acting as a purchaser of goods. "[T]he state as regulator is prohibited
from discriminating against out-of-state commerce [while] the state as
purchaser has the same freedom as a private citizen to choose the
partner with whom it will engage in commerce." I" This analysis was
applied by the New Jersey Supreme Court to the Public Broadcasting
Authority, taking the view that the state was a proprietor in the
business of broadcasting, not regulating private broadcasting." 2 The
court maintained that the Authority, as the owner of an FCC licensed
station, was granted broad discretion concerning election coverage
under federal law. 1 3 The Authority "used this discretion granted by
Federal law by deciding that coverage shall be characterized by 'balance, fairness and equity.' ""114 The court therefore found that the
state statutes were enacted "pursuant to rather than in conflict
with" 15 the federal statutes.
The majority opinion further justified the state statutory provision mandating balance in election coverage by pointing out two
additional factors: the Authority's virtual monopoly on New Jersey
election news, and the potential partisan tropism of a governmentowned system." 6 Under these circumstances the court maintained
that the legislature's decision to impose a greater obligation of fair and
balanced coverage than imposed by the federal government was "perfectly appropriate." ' The federal regulatory scheme is not so comprehensive as to preclude reasonable state regulation where, as here,
the state regulations are not repugnant to or inconsistent with the
federal scheme."'
"I Id. The court pointed out that both the United States and New Jersey Supreme Courts
agree that the commerce clause does not apply to the state as a purchaser. Id. Quoting a
commerce clause case, the court implied that the present case was one in which the state actually
provided a medium of expression not one in which the state impaired the medium:
It is important to differentiate between commerce which flourishes in a free
market and commerce which owes its existence to a state subsidy program. Our cases
finding that a state regulation constitutes an impermissible burden on interstate
commerce all dealt with restrictions that adversely affected the operation of a free
market. This case is unique because the commerce which [the state] has 'burdened' is
commerce which would not exist if [the state] had not decided to subsidize a portion
of the . . . business.
Id. (quoting Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 815 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
112 Id. at 139, 439 A.2d at 67.
113

Id.

Id.
11 Id. (emphasis in original).
16 Id. at 140, 439 A.2d at 68.
114

117

Id.

11 Id. at 142, 439 A.2d at 69. The court noted that Congress, confronted with the danger of
inhibited news coverage, determined to "tip the scales substantially towards volume of news
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A second constitutional argument raised by the Authority was
that the first amendment proscribed all constraints applicable in the
present context such as the requirements of balance, fairness, and
equity. Though the first amendment does limit governmental restraints on private broadcasters, "it does not prevent government itself
from participating."1 9 The court referred to the analysis found in
Community-Service Broadcasting v. FCC, 2 0 which instructed that
when the state does choose to speak, "it may express its own viewpoint
. . . or it may neutrally relay the messages of others.""'2 New Jersey's
statutory scheme focuses on the latter. 2 2 Furthermore, the court indi2 3
cated that "no private speech [was] being limited."
After dismissing the Authority's constitutional challenges the supreme court examined the meaning of "balance, fairness and equity." 24 It found that the mandate of coverage found in the Campaign Contributions Act was to be "read in a spirit of
reasonableness.' 25 That Act, no longer exacting a tribute of equal
time, was instead interpreted as an admonition to the Authority that
its "election coverage over the course of the campaign [be] not on the
whole unfair to any candidate." 2 6 The Authority was instructed that
the statutory standard was not to be construed strictly or inflexibly,
but with a "significant degree of discretion in carrying out this man2 7
date of fairness."
The reference in the Campaign Contributions Act to federal law
was explained by Justice Pashman to mean that the statute was to be
read in conjunction with the relevant Federal Communications Act
provisions. 2 Though not delineated in the state statute, the court
found that the New Jersey Legislature intended for "special treatment
be given to bona fide news programs under [section] 315 which excoverage, sacrificing equality if necessary." Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 97-100. That
danger was not an issue in this case since the Authority is under a "legal duty... to promote full
discussion of the issues." 88 N.J. at 142, 439 A.2d at 69.
19 Id. (citing Community-Service Broadcasting v. FCC, 593 F.2d 1102, 1110 n.17 (D.C. Cir.
1978); L. TRIBE, supra note 89, § 12-4, at 588-90).
120593 F.2d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
12188 N.J. at 143, 439 A.2d at 69 (citing Community-Service Broadcasting, 539 F.2d at 1110
n.17; L. TRIBE, supra note 89, § 12-4, at 590).
122Id.
121Id. (emphasis added).
124 Id. at 144, 439 A.2d at 70.
125 Id.

126 Id.
127 Id.
12I Id. at 145, 439 A.2d at 71. Justice Pashman specifically noted that the federal law did not
supersede the state statutory provisions, but instead should be read in pari materia with the state
statutes. Id.
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empts such coverage from the equal opportunity provisions." 129 Thus,
"the Authority has been given a higher degree of discretion regarding
newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries and coverage of
news events." 1 30 The court endorsed reliance upon the FCC news
categories, as they have been progressively honed, as determinative of
when the equal opportunity provision is triggered.' 13 The majority
found that New Jersey's overall fairness mandate relieved the Authority of this onerous burden of categorizing news broadcasts. 132 These
programs can range from the clearly news to the clearly debate,
therefore the court recommended a sliding scale analysis wherein
"[t]he greater the news content of a given program, the more the
Authority can feel free to allow its journalistic judgment guide its
actions." 133
Although the New Jersey Supreme Court laid down guidelines
for Authority action, it refused to formulate detailed rules on the basis
of a single case. 134 The court regarded the statutes as embodiments of
general principles which the legislature was reluctant to render in
specific particularity. 135 Justice Pashman, writing for the majority,
held that to so specify would be a violation of the legislature's intent to
leave substantial discretion to the Authority plus a usurpation of the
Authority's rule-making power. 13 In its final synthesis the McGlynn
court held "that the New Jersey Public Broadcasting Authority has a
statutory duty to promote full discussion of public issues by guberna137
torial candidates and to do so with balance, fairness and equity.'
"A candidate [who wishes] to challenge the Authority's coverage of a
gubernatorial campaign will be required to prove that the Authority's
coverage, examined over the entire course of the campaign, has been
or threatens to be unreasonably imbalanced.' 138 The court emphasized that the statute mandating balanced coverage did "not confer on
an individual candidate a right to be included in any given program
. ..only [a] right . . . to fairness, balance and equity in the entirety
of the Authority's election coverage."' 39 Therefore, the court deter-

129 Id.

Id.
Id.
132 Id. at 146, 439 A.2d at 71.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
130

131

136Id.
137
138
131

Id.
Id. at 147, 439 A.2d at 71.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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mined that the Authority's exclusion of candidates from "A Closer
140
Look" was reasonable.
Chief Justice Wilentz's concurring opinion differed radically
from the majority, concluding that the legislature intended for the
Authority Act to subject the Authority solely to federal law and FCC
rules in its coverage of candidate activities. ' 4 He based his conclusion
upon the language of the Campaign Contributions Act which directs
42
that all disputes be determined "in accordance with federal law."
The Chief Justice found it implicit in this statutory language that the
FCC should have jurisdiction over candidate complaints. 43 Furthermore, the Chief Justice anticipated that as a consequence of the
majority opinion, news reporting would be inhibited and relations
between the Authority and sister public television systems would be
44
strained. 1
Chief Justice Wilentz expressed concern over the majority's expansive interpretation of the Authority Act. He noted the practical
absence of language in the Authority Act regarding candidate coverage. 145 According to Chief Justice Wilentz, the only relevant provision, "relied on by the majority, prohibit[ed] the Authority 'from
supporting or opposing any political party or candidate for public
office, elective or otherwise.' ",146 While the majority read the language opposing political, partisanship as part of a legislative plan to
impose upon the Authority enforceable fairness requirements, 147 Chief
Justice Wilentz found the similarities of language between the Act and
an antecedent report by the Governor's Commission on Public Broadcasting 4 1 suggestive of legislative intent that the New Jersey Public
Television System should be free of any political influence in the
140
141

142

Id. at 148, 439 A.2d at 72.
Id. at 149, 439 A.2d at 73 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring).
Id. The majority opinion relied on the sponsor's statement accompanying the bill which

mentioned both state and federal law to support its position, whereas the dissent relied on the
language of the statute, itself, which did not mention state law. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
14 88 N.J. at 149, 439 A.2d at 73 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring).
144 Id. at 162, 439 A.2d at 79 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring).
145 Id. at 150, 439 A.2d at 73 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring).
14
Id. (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:23-9 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983)). The source of this
prohibition is a report issued by the Governor's Commission on Public Broadcasting, which
envisioned the Authority as an independent entity relatively free of state control. REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS TO NEW JEaSEY CITIZENS, supra note 43. The Commission's vision of the
Authority was as a nonprofit and nonpolitical entity. Id. at 29. To ensure this, the Commission

recommended that the Authority "should be prohibited from supporting or opposing any political party or candidate for public office, elective or otherwise, and from attempting to influence
legislation." Id.
14' 88 N.J. at 151, 439 A.2d at 73-74 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring).
148 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO NEW JERSEY CITIZENS, supra

note 43.
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determination of its broadcast content. 49 Thus, to the Chief Justice,
the Authority was to have greater discretion, not less, for if the
legislature had indeed desired greater content control, the Federal
50
Communications Act could have served as a model.1
Chief Justice Wilentz next addressed the majority's interpretation
of the Act's "balance, fairness and equity" language. He noted that the
source of this language was a section of the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting Act15 1 which calls upon the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting to present its programs with "objectivity and balance." 5 2 Chief Justice Wilentz found it significant that this section of
the Corporation for Public Broadcasting Act had not been interpreted
by the FCC or federal courts, which refused to do so on the grounds
that they lacked jurisdiction to interpret the congressional standard of
"objectivity and balance" because the standard was not a substantive
one. '.3 Similarly, the concurring opinion declined to read section 7(h)
of the Authority Act as a standard enforceable by the New Jersey
courts, instead regarding it "as a guide for the [Public Broadcasting
54
Authority] to follow in its coverage of issues and ideas and policies."
149 88 N.J. at 151, 439 A.2d at 73-74 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring). A second apparent source
for the prohibitive language of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:23-9 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983),
further weakening the majority's argument, are various sections of the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting Act (CPB), 47 U.S.C. §§ 396-399 (1976). First, the Chief Justice noted § 396(f)(3)
provides that the CPB "may not contribute to or otherwise support any political party or
candidate for elective office." Id. Second, § 399(a) mandates that "no noncommercial educational broadcasting station may engage in editorializing or may support or oppose any candidate
for public office." Id. "The New Jersey public broadcasting stations are within this definition
and consequently are forbidden by section 399(a) to engage in editorializing or political endorsement." 88 N.J. at 151-52, 439 A.2d at 74-75 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring). The suggestion that
section 399 (similar to section 9 of the New Jersey act) adds some requirement of equal or fair
coverage of political elections beyond that imposed already by section 315 of the Federal
Communications Act is a radical interpretation which the concurring opinion found unsupported by independent language of the New Jersey Legislature. 88 N.J. at 152-53, 439 A.2d at
74-75 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring).
"5 88 N.J. at 152-53, 439 A.2d at 74-75 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring). It was clear to Chief
Justice Wilentz that a construction which transformed a prohibition against political endorsements into a mandate for fair coverage was without justification. Id.
"1' See 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(A) (1976).
15288 N.J. at 153, 439 A.2d at 75 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(l)(A)
(1976)). In § 396(g)(1)(A), the CPB is empowered to "facilitate the full development of public
telecommunications in which programs of high quality, diversity, creativity, excellence, and
innovation, which are obtained from diverse sources, will be made available to public telecommunications entities, with strict adherence to objectivity and balance in all programs or series of
programs of a controversial nature." Id.
".3 88 N.J. at 153, 439 A.2d at 75 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring); see, e.g., Network Project v.
Corporation for Pub. Broadcasting, 561 F.2d 963 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1068
(1978); Accuracy in Media v. FCC, 521 F.2d 288 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934
(1976).
'1
88 N.J. at 153, 439 A.2d at 75 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring).
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One point of agreement between Chief Justice Wilentz and the
majority was that the public financing law was designed to "expend
public funds to make it easier for gubernatorial candidates to run"
their campaigns.1 55 Justice Wilentz did not agree, however, that the
Campaign Contributions Act guaranteed anything more than minimum coverage- finding no basis for an imposition of a "balance,
fairness and equity" standard.156
Chief Justice Wilentz reviewed the various amendments to the
Campaign Contributions Act. 57 In so doing he compared the sponsor's statement to the 1981 amendment which explained that " 'the
bill would direct the New Jersey Public Broadcasting Authority to
provide coverage of the gubernatorial primary and general election
campaigns and give the Authority the discretion, within the limits of
federal and state law, as to the manner in which it does so,' 158 with
the final bill which did not contain the word state. Justice Wilentz
argued that this was a clear indication of the legislature's intent to
have the Authority's discretion limited only by federal law.159 That
the Governor, in signing the bill, announced that it would give the
Authority "maximum discretion, within federal law," was added to
strengthen his argument.16 0 Therefore, as a result of this determination that only federal law applied to candidate coverage, the issue of
whether the Authority Act contained requirements concerning candidate coverage, or whether the Campaign Contributions Act imposed
an obligation of fairness or equality was considered by Justice Wilentz
to be irrelevant.16 '
In a separate concurring opinion Justice Pollock focused on the
possible conversion of New Jersey Public Television into a public
forum. 1 2 He feared the McGlynn holding might undermine the Au-
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Id. at 155, 439 A.2d at 76 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring).

Id. at 155-56, 439 A.2d at 76 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring).
at 156-57, 439 A.2d at 76-77 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring).
158 Id. at 157-58, 439 A.2d at 77 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring) (quoting Sponsor's Statement,
supra note 82) (emphasis added by court).
59 Id. at 158, 439 A.2d at 77 (Wilentz, C.J. concurring). Chief Justice Wilentz pointed out
that the majority "'refuse[d] to face or even admit the indisputable fact that" the legislature
changed the wording of the bill as originally introduced. Id. This is not strictly correct. The
majority did place great emphasis on the legislative history of the bill, possibly granting it greater
weight than even the bill itself. See id. at 128-29, 439 A.2d at 62. The majority, however,
buttressed its reading with the argument that if the legislature had intended only federal
constraints, then such an interpretation would render the new provisions "mere surplusage, since
the Authority is required to abide by the Federal Communications Act independent of N.J.S.A.
19:44A-39." Id. at 129-30, 439 A.2d at 62.
160Id. at 159, 439 A.2d at 78 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring).
161Id.
162Id. at 178-80, 439 A.2d at 88-89 (Pollock, J., concurring).
I
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thority's broadcasting independence by permitting excess access. 163
Although the FCC has determined that "publicly held noncommercial
broadcasters are not subject to the public forum doctrine," 1 4 Justice
Pollock nonetheless feared that the majority opinion was inconclusive,
leaving open "the question whether the state could own, operate and
regulate [New Jersey Public Television] without converting it into a
16 5
public forum."
Both concurring opinions expressed objections which centered
upon the possible harmful effect the "balance, fairness and equity"
mandate will have on the journalistic freedom of the Authority and
upon the ability of the state courts to deal with candidate challenges
effectively. 166 It was noted that the FCC has had more than thirty
years dealing with media campaign coverage, and as Chief Justice
Wilentz remarked, "[t]here are few tasks that have been found by
Congress to be more intractable and complex than devising legislation
67
and a set of rules for the 'fair' treatment of candidates on TV."1
Justices Wilentz and Pollock maintained that the New Jersey courts
were totally unprepared for the McGlynn challenge, 6 8 and further
that the rules to apply to the challenge should have been those of the
69
FCC. 1
The new standard itself was viewed by the concurring justices as
171
a result which "spells chaos."' 170 This Pandora's box of problems
includes the fact that there will be two forums, the FCC and the state
courts, and hence two standards, to which candidates may turn for
remedy. 172 Furthermore, state courts will face a difficult task in applying the imprecise language of the majority's standard of "balance,
fairness and equity" over the course of the campaign, leading to
varying interpretations based upon the multitude of policy consider163 Id. at 180, 439 A.2d at 88 (Pollock, J.,concurring).

Id. at 179, 439 A.2d at 88 (Pollock, J.,concurring).
'6
165Id. at 180, 439 A.2d at 88 (Pollock, J., concurring).
166Id. at 180-82, 439 A.2d at 88-89 (Pollock, J., concurring); id.at 164-70, 439 A.2d at 81-83
(Wilentz, C.J., concurring).
161Id. at 165, 439 A.2d at 61 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring).
'8 Id. at 168, 439 A.2d at 82 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring); id. at 180-82, 439 A.2d at 89
(Pollock, J., concurring).
169Id. at 169, 439 A.2d at 83 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring); id. at 182, 439 A.2d at 89 (Pollock,
J., concurring).
170 Id. at 168, 439 A.2d at 83 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring).
1I7Id. at 178, 439 A.2d at 88 (Pollock, J., concurring).
172 "On the same dispute where more than one candidate complains about the same failure of
coverage, one may go to the FCC and get no relief, the other to our courts and obtain relief;
appeals may be pending in the Court of Appeals in a Federal Circuit, while the same issue is
being decided by the Appellate Division in New Jersey." 88 N.J. at 168-69, 439 A.2d at 83
(Wilentz, C.J., concurring).
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ations. 7 3 Finally, both justices feared the McGlynn holding would
affect the independence of the New Jersey system in its ability to work
as an equal partner with other public television systems who are not
1 74
hampered by state regulations.
The New Jersey Supreme Court's holding in McGlynn is limited
to broadcast coverage of gubernatorial election campaigns. 75 As a
result, the effect of the court's decision could very well alter the
mechanisms of New Jersey politics in ways that are presently unforeseeable because of the relative infrequency of gubernatorial elections.
It is unlikely, however, that this decision will be ignored by candidates in other New Jersey elections or by the state courts before whom
they bring their challenges. Therefore, McGlynn could have more farreaching ramifications.
The idiosyncratic nature of the noncommercial public broadcasting system in New Jersey and its role as an instrumentality of the state
government present a unique problem to the courts in the area of
broadcast regulation. In the foreground of the McGlynn controversy
are candidates seeking access to a public television system through
which they would express their views on various issues-pertinent to an
upcoming election. Sharing the spotlight is a public television systrn
whose journalistic integrity requires that the system maintain editorial
control that is independent and free from any partisan influence. Thus
far, the controversy does not appear to pose an insurmountable problem.
This particular case, however, is further complicated by the fact
that the New Jersey electorate, in need of information upon which to
cast its gubernatorial votes, must rely upon a state-owned television
network to provide most of the local news coverage. The existence of
federal and state statutes muddle the issue by laying down competing,
possibly exclusive, standards of guidance and remedy. The choice is
between FCC review according to the federal law governing political
broadcasting under section 315(a), and the New Jersey Supreme
Court's standard of "balance, fairness and equity" over the course of
the campaign.

173 Id. at 162, 439 A.2d at 79 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring). "And the standard is so indefinite
that it must cause great doubts on the part of those responsible for programming." Id. at 162, 439
A.2d at 80 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Wilentz also feared that an aura of
inhibition might attach as a result of greater restrictions, and New Jersey Public Television
would be unable to fulfill its function of presenting public issues. Id. at 169, 439 A.2d at 83
(Wilentz, C.J., concurring).
174 Id. at 161-62, 439 A.2d at 79 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring); id. at 177, 439 A.2d at 87
(Pollock, J., concurring).
175 Id. at 146, 439 A.2d at 71.
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The ultimate goal is for the citizens of New Jersey to receive from
their state broadcasting network the best possible coverage of an
election campaign. All opinion converges here. The disagreement is
with the method. The decision rendered by the FCC denying candidate Klein's claim to access happened, in this case, to concur with the
court's denial of McGlynn's claim. But similar results will not always
be the case where the standards of review differ. New Jersey Public
Television's unique role as primary disseminator of local political
coverage places a mandate of "fairness" on the Authority's shoulders
not shared by private television stations. The unequal burden of responsibility carried by the two systems will likely result in a more
receptive atmosphere within the New Jersey state courts toward candidate challenges. McGlynn demonstrates that a state court challenge
will at least result in a review of the merits, whereas an FCC challenge may be summarily disposed of.
The absence of a clearly defined set of standards whereby the
limits of the Authority's discretion could be measured is certain to
create confusion in the New Jersey courts when comparable candidate
challenges are heard. Without a definite standard each case will be,
decided on its own peculiar facts, probably on an emergent basis,
until an established body of case law develops. The fact that these
cases will, in most circumstances, be decided on an emergency basis
with little time for a court to prepare is a serious one. But there is no
evidence that the Authority is not capable of skillful management of a
campaign's coverage or that it would be unable to carry out the
fairness mandate. If the Authority proves itself to be so capable, and
candidates recognize that they must prove unfair treatment over the
course of the campaign, a significant number of challenges may be
forestalled.
A more basic threat may be to the inherent well-being of the
Authority's editorial processes. The McGlynn decision could deleteriously restrict the newsperson's ability and freedom to serve the public
by inhibiting coverage in an area which might be regarded as one
calling, on the one hand, for absolute freedom of expression on the
part of the reporter but, on the other hand, for a maximum degree of
circumspection in the reporting. This complaint may prove groundless
for the Authority is to be judged on its coverage of the entire campaign. As can be seen from the court's holding, even a denial of
coverage in the last week of a campaign will not be found abusive if
the rest of the coverage was "balanced, fair and equitable."
The New Jersey Supreme Court's willingness to offer the courts as
a forum for candidates dissatisfied with New Jersey Public Television's
coverage of their campaign bespeaks a concern for the need of New
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Jersey's populace to be fully informed regarding the electoral options
in the gubernatorial elections. Although no clear and unambiguous
proscription exists in a single statute spelling out public television's
relationship with political candidates, that did not prevent the court
from finding a shared legislative concern with fairness inherent in the
campaign coverage evidenced through the Authority and Campaign
Contributions Acts.
William M. Robins

